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NEUTRALITY UNDER THE RELIGION
CLAUSES
Michael W. McConnell*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a curious example of doctrinal imperialism, the "equal protection
mode of analysis"' has come to dominate the interpretation of many
other clauses of the Constitution. This extends even to those, like the
religion clauses, that appear from their language to denote specific sub-
stantive liberties and institutional arrangements. 2 Thus, the question be-
comes not "what interpretation will best foster religious liberty?" or
"what interpretation will best achieve the institutional relationship be-
tween church and state intended by the establishment clause?," but
rather "how do we remain neutral between religion and nonreligion?"
Professor Laycock's article is an excellent example of the equal pro-
tection mode of analysis. He defends properly drafted and implemented
equal access and moment-of-silence policies on the ground that they are
"strictly neutral" with respect to religion. 3 And so, for all practical pur-
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. As a matter of full dis-
closure, I point out that I helped draft the briefs for the United States in a number of the cases
discussed in this Article: Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) (brief in oppo-
sition to petition for certiorari); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748
(1986). This Article originally was delivered at the Symposium on Associational Freedom and Pri-
vate Discrimination, Northwestern University School of Law (Oct. 14, 1985), as a response to Pro-
fessor Laycock. I expanded the Article after the close of the Supreme Court's 1985 Term to include
discussion of recent decisions.
1 So called by Justice Harlan in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970),
2 A striking recent example is Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689 (1984), which interprets "the dormant commerce, privileges and immunities, equal pro-
tection, due process, contract, and eminent domain clauses" as essentially equivalent to an unre-
strained version of equal protection rationality review. In the religion context, see Garvey, Freedom
and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 193; Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 311 (1986).
3 Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by
Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (1986). Throughout this Article I will use the term "neu-
trality" in the way it is used by the Court: a government action is "neutral" if it "neither advances
nor inhibits religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); see also Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). Professor Laycock apparently uses the term the same
way. See Laycock, supra, at 2 n.6. But see infra note 17. Neutrality among religions presents
wholly different issues.
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poses, they are. There is no need to repeat his arguments; I strongly
agree with most of them. The question I propose to explore, instead, is
whether neutrality toward religious expression exhausts the protections
of religious liberty the Constitution provides. In short, is neutrality
enough?
Critics of neutrality as the governing principle under the religion
clauses form two opposing camps: Those who posit separation of church
and state as the controlling principle4 and those who instead give control-
ling weight to considerations of liberty and its concomitants-pluralism
and diversity.5 It is a mistake to assume that these opposing views are
unprincipled or simply ill-considered. It is not correct, for example, that
separationists "who oppose equal access and moments of silence do so in
the name of neutrality."' 6 To the true separationist, religious institutions
must be treated differently from other comparable institutions precisely
because the government must remain separate from religion in a way that
it need not be from other institutions. This may harm religion,7 or it may
help it,8 but it is not neutral.
More serious, in my view, is the common misunderstanding and dis-
paragement of those who believe that religious liberty-the freedom to
choose and practice one's own religion, or none at all-is of greater im-
portance than neutrality, when the two values clash. Professor Laycock,
for example, states that "[i]t is generally the religious right that demands
government support for religion and denies that the establishment clause
requires neutrality." 9 This, I take it, is not an endorsement of the view
he describes. Yet one need look no further than the last Term of the
Supreme Court to see that this unsympathetic generalization is not
accurate.
4 See, e.g., A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1964);
Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969); Pfeffer, Freedom and/or
Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN L. REV. 561 (1980);
Redlich, Separation of Church and State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1094 (1985); Teitel, When Separate Is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike
Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 175 (1986); Tribe, The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1973).
5 See, eg., M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965); Gianella, Religious Lib-
erty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part II" The Nonestablishment Principle, 81
HARV. L. REV. 513 (1968); Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding
of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1978); Schwarz, No Imposition of
Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968).
6 Laycock, supra note 3, at 7.
7 See, eg., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8 See, eg., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). Probably the best discussion of this
aspect of separationism is Professor Laycock's Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses:
The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373
(1981).
9 Laycock, supra note 3, at 6-7.
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Captain Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew and a rabbi, came
before the Supreme Court seeking an exemption, on religious grounds,
from Air Force uniform regulations that prevented him from wearing the
traditional skullcap, or yarmulke, while on duty.10 The regulations are
wholly "neutral." Neither Jews nor Gentiles are permitted to wear a
skullcap or otherwise deviate from the uniform. Is that the end of the
matter? If the American military fails to make an accommodation for
the skullcap, it will be impossible for observant Orthodox Jews to serve.
While this is a possible construction of the first amendment religion
clauses, it strikes me as neither attractive nor compelling.
The other individual before the Court last Term "demand[ing] gov-
ernment support for religion and den[ying] that the establishment clause
requires neutrality" was Stephen J. Roy, an Abenaki Indian who asserted
a religious objection to using a Social Security number." If he is a mem-
ber of the "religious right," it has not come to my attention. Nonethe-
less, Mr. Roy and Captain Goldman are typical of the free exercise
plaintiffs who have come before the Court in the past: an Amish em-
ployer objecting to mandatory participation in the Social Security sys-
tem,12 a Jehovah's Witness objecting to working on armaments, 13 Amish
parents objecting to compulsory schooling for their teenage children, 14 a
Seventh Day Adventist objecting to being required to work on Satur-
day, 15 and Jewish shopkeepers objecting to being required to close their
business on Sunday when they observe their Sabbath on Saturday. 16 The
common element is that, as adherents of minority faiths, these individu-
als' beliefs came into conflict with the facially neutral rules and practices
of society, which are geared to the interests of the majority. And as soci-
ety becomes ever more secular, many more persons of varying religious
persuasions (even the "religious right") will require "special treatment"
in order to remain faithful to their religious tenets.
To insist on strict neutrality in all cases arising under the religion
clauses would be wholly inconsistent with the demands of free exercise
and, as the separationists would emphasize, nonestablishment as well.
Protections for religious liberty are no more "neutral" toward religion
than freedom of the press is "neutral" toward the press. But this is not
to deny that neutrality, properly understood, is a major element in the
analysis. My intention here is to justify reliance on neutrality in most
cases as a means of guaranteeing the more important objective, religious
10 Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
11 Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
12 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
13 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
14 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
15 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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liberty, and to suggest an analysis for determining when departures from
religious neutrality are either permissible or constitutionally required.
II. NEUTRALITY AS A STARTING POINT
Neutrality among religions and, when appropriate, between religion
and nonreligion, is a sound starting point for analyzing religious freedom
issues. Neutrality is usually the course most consistent with religious
liberty because, ideally, government action should leave untouched the
preexisting religious mix in the community. A liberal regime should
leave decisions about religious practice to the independent judgment of
the people. 17
There are times when neutrality is sufficient to protect religious lib-
erty; Niemotko v. Maryland18 is such a case. In Niemotko, religious
speakers needed access to the public parks in order to fulfill their reli-
gious duty to proselytize, but they needed no more access than was ac-
corded any other speaker. All they asked was that religion not be
disfavored.19 Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind,20 decided last Term, is also such a case. Witters, a blind man who
was entitled to a state tuition grant to pursue any course of study that
would lead to a career, asked only that the state not treat his chosen
career-the ministry-differently from careers not involving religion.
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District21-part of the "equal
access" controversy discussed by Professor Laycock-is almost such a
case. The high school students in Bender asked that they be permitted to
meet at the school on essentially the same terms as all other voluntary,
student-initiated extracurricular groups. They asked that religion not be
disfavored; they sought no special privileges. Their claim can be sup-
ported on the ground that it is neutral, but the deeper reason why their
claim is meritorious is that allowing them to meet promotes religious
liberty.
We should not lose sight of the human element in Bender. Equal
17 I therefore commend Professor Laycock's somewhat heterodox formulation of neutrality: "I
do not mean neutrality in the sense of a ban on religious classifications. Instead, I mean neutrality in
the sense of government conduct that insofar as possible neither encourages nor discourages religious
belief or practice. This requires identification of a base line from which to measure encouragement
and discouragement." Laycock, supra note 3, at 3 (footnote omitted). If this definition of neutrality
were employed by the Court, we would come a lot closer to a liberty-oriented understanding of the
religion clauses.
18 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
19 See also, eg., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67 (1953); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979); cf Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding time, place, and manner restric-
tions when applied neutrally to religious and nonreligious groups).
20 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986).
21 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986). This case was not resolved on the merits because the Court concluded
that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction.
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access protects a liberty of incalculable value to the high school students
involved, who needed the rights of speech and association to maintain
their religious identity. The religious sensibility of these students easily
could have been overwhelmed by the secular environment of the Wil-
liamsport Area High School. The ideals of popularity, worldly success,
and materialism-not to mention the realities of sex, drugs, and vio-
lence-are surely more prominent features of modem high school life
than faith and good works. Lisa Bender explained the impulse behind
the meetings well:
We recognized the need to have a fellowship with other Christians in the
school, to be able to encourage one another, and also to make Christianity
more a part of our everyday lives and not just a . . . Sunday type of
thing.... I was really encouraged by the fact that I was not alone in my
beliefs and that I could share my problems and my prayer requests with
other students who were concerned. 22
Allowing the students to meet together does not impose religion on any-
one; it merely enables those who wish to do so to engage in religious
expression.
In fact, if one wanted to be a stickler, the students' claim in Bender
was not precisely for neutral treatment. They, unlike all other student
groups, would meet without the active participation of a faculty sponsor.
To me, this departure is not troubling. Whether from the perspective of
separation or of liberty, agents of the state ought not assume a leadership
role in religious groups.23 The departure, however, is not neutral.
The students' claim is less than neutral in another respect: the stu-
dents voluntarily declined use of the school's public address system, bul-
letin board, and newspaper to publicize their meetings. This nonneutral
treatment is presumably because of the competing claims to religious lib-
erty by other students. Other students have a right, when attending
school under the compulsion of the state, not to be compelled to listen to
the efforts of religious groups to drum up attendance.24 If one were to
apply a rigid "strict neutrality" principle here, without considering the
possibility that deviations from neutrality may sometimes enhance reli-
22 Religious Speech Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary,
and Vocational Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56
(1984) (statement of Lisa Bender Parker).
23 Professor Laycock apparently agrees that this difference between the religious group and
other student groups is required. Laycock, supra note 3, at 29.
24 Thus, not allowing the religious group to use the public address system is justified. But
preventing it from using bulletin boards and newspapers goes too far. Other students are not captive
audiences for these messages. Cf. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 971 n.8
(5th Cir. 1972) (distribution of newspapers not "method of expression that materially and substan-
tially interferes with the rights of others"); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp.
731, 735-36 (E.D. Va.) (public school students not "captive audience" of school newspapers), aff'd,
564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (school
newspaper did not violate religious freedom of those who disagreed with it), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d
Cir. 1975).
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gious liberty, the equal access policy would be significantly more
problematic. 25
Thus, when we move beyond the surface of Bender, we see that the
mere invocation of neutrality does not resolve the problem. We need a
theory to account for when other considerations, such as liberty, dictate
a departure from strict neutrality.
The real question is whether governmental action, taken as a whole,
distorts religious choice-not whether the action makes explicit or im-
plicit reference to religion. There are occasions when applying facially
neutral rules to religious organizations or activities throws the weight of
the government against religious practices, especially minority religious
practices. There are also occasions when no truly neutral course is avail-
able. In such instances, the government may appropriately recognize
and make adjustments for the special needs of religion. There are three
major contexts in which neutrality either may or must be subordinated to
religious liberty: (1) When religious practice is suppressed or inhibited as
an incidental consequence of facially neutral governmental action; (2)
when enforcement of a neutral regulatory scheme would interfere with a
religious organization's internal structure and doctrine; and (3) when the
governmental presence is so pervasive that religious exercise would be
impossible in the absence of affirmative accommodation. I will discuss
each of these in turn.
III. SUPPRESSION OR INHIBITION OF RELIGION AS AN INCIDENTAL
CONSEQUENCE OF NEUTRAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
The most familiar example of constitutionally justified departures
from religious neutrality occurs when facially neutral rules come into
conflict with religious observances or scruples. Deeply rooted in our his-
tory,26 these exceptions for religious conscience stem from the under-
standing that governmental and religious authorities have different
25 Professor Laycock apparently concludes that student religious groups should have been per-
mitted to use the public address system on equal terms with other student groups-which presuma-
bly would include forceful attempts at persuasion. Laycock, supra note 3, at 35. His somewhat
inconsistent suggestion that these announcements would have to be kept "brief and factual" would
require censorship and at the same time depart from neutrality. This is a telling example of how a
focus on neutrality instead of liberty can lead to an incorrect result.
26 As long ago as the seventeenth century, the colonial governments made explicit "Indulgences
and Dispensations" from their laws to avoid conflict with religious scruples. See T. CURRY, THE
FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 56 (1986). By the time the first amendment was proposed, 12 of the 13 states (Connecticut
was the exception) had guarantees of religious liberty in their state constitutions, many of them using
the term "free exercise." The language of these provisions demonstrates that they contemplated
religiously based exemptions from facially neutral legislation, provided they would not disrupt the
peace and safety of the state. See, e.g., B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLO-
NIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 383 (1877) (Georgia); id. at
1281 (New Hampshire); id. at 1338 (New York); id. at 1909 (Virginia).
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functions, each of which is legitimate and must be respected by the other.
The government cannot dictate the forms of worship, and the church
cannot control the affairs of state.27 Free exercise cases arise when an
obligation or prohibition seen by the government as secular, such as serv-
ing in the military, is seen by the believer as violating a tenet of his faith.
The function of the free exercise clause is to designate an independent
third party, the judiciary, to decide whether religion or state must give
way when these conflicts arise and to set a general rule of decision.
Religious conscience thus stands on a different constitutional footing
than other moral or political disagreements with governmental policy.
The special obligations, positive and negative, faced by the religious be-
liever are outside the competence of governmental institutions to accept
or reject, weigh or evaluate. This distinguishes the believer from his fel-
low citizens who may have disagreements with the state over issues of
secular moral judgment. On secular moral issues, the government can
and does take sides: against racism, for patriotism, against pacifism, for
family planning, against smoking. On religious issues the government
may not seek to sway public or private opinion. It cannot dispute, much
less reject in principle, the claims of faith.
The free exercise clause is a reflection of the reality that the believer
stands in a unique position with respect to secular government: he is
vulnerable to inconsistent obligations that cannot be reconciled in purely
secular terms. If, for example, Prohibition had been applied, neutrally
and without religious exception, to all consumption of alcohol, then the
central sacrament of the Roman Catholic faith would have been out-
lawed. 28 The believer's sacred obligation to partake of the eucharist
would have been in conflict with his duty to obey the law of the land.
Similarly, if Jehovah's Witnesses were required to serve on juries, they
would be forced to violate a tenet of their faith.29 In each instance, a
neutral law, which may be of slight inconvenience to most people, puts
the believer to the painful choice of disobeying the law or violating the
tenets of his faith.30
Neutrality, in such a circumstance, is skewed in favor of either the
majority religious faction or nonreligion. Rarely will a neutral rule be
passed or enforced that conflicts with the religious beliefs of the majority.
Minority faiths are not so fortunate. Requiring strict neutrality is there-
27 See, e.g., . LOCKE, A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1955);
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 1, reprinted in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (app.) (1947).
28 Congress enacted an exception to Prohibition for use of sacramental wine. 27 U.S.C. § 16
(1925); cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (peyote permitted
to be used in religious ceremonies of Native American Church).
29 See United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943); see also In re Jenison, 375
U.S. 14 (1963) (Biblical literalist may be excused from jury duty).
30 See Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 792-801
(1986); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 14-20, 26-27 (1985).
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fore tantamount to requiring minorities to conform to majoritarian prac-
tices, even when those practices are in conflict with their religious
obligations.
But to state that religious objections should sometimes be accorded
special protection does not mean that they must automatically take pre-
cedence over conflicting governmental interests. Sometimes the govern-
mental interest must override even sincere and fundamental religious
beliefs. Supreme Court doctrine states that when a governmental rule or
practice burdens the exercise of religion, the objector should be exempted
unless there is a "compelling" or "overriding" governmental interest to
the contrary.31 This formulation is similar to the "strict scrutiny" ap-
plied to legislation that discriminates on the basis of race, or perhaps to
the level of scrutiny applied to sex classifications. It suggests that reli-
gious exemptions (that is, departures from religious neutrality) should be
the rule; only when governmental interests are especially strong should
these exemptions be refused.
I believe this "strict scrutiny" model for free exercise cases is mis-
leading, at least as a description of the Court's decisions. The Court fre-
quently (especially recently) rejects free exercise challenges even when
the government's secular programmatic interest is relatively weak. The
reason is that some members of the Court are reluctant, in the free exer-
cise context, to approve of any departures from facially neutral rules.
The combination of the government's secular programmatic interests and
the judicial commitment to facial neutrality tends to defeat claims for
religious exemption except when the governmental interest is exception-
ally weak.
Two recent decisions, United States v. Lee32 and Goldman v. Wein-
berger,33 illustrate the point. In both cases, the Court rejected free exer-
cise challenges to neutral governmental rules even though the
government's programmatic interest was far less than "compelling." In
Lee, the Court rejected the claim of an Amish employer, on behalf of
himself and his small, all-Amish work force, to exemption from Social
Security taxation. The majority analogized the Social Security tax to
other taxes, and concluded that "the broad public interest in maintaining
a sound tax system is of such a high order" 34 that it justified interference
with what the Court expressly conceded to be tenets of the Amish faith.35
31 E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1324-25 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
The recent plurality opinion in Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986), purports to modify free
exercise doctrine by distinguishing between "direct" and "indirect" burdens on religious exercise.
Five Justices expressly repudiate this suggestion in Roy. This is not the occasion to show why the
plurality is mistaken.
32 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
33 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
34 Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.
35 See id. at 257.
81:146 (1986)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Court's approach is not persuasive. Exemption of religious objectors
from the Social Security system-unlike exemption from other taxes-
relieves the government of a liability as well as a source of revenue. The
net impact on the Social Security Trust Fund might well be positive.
A better explanation for the Court's conclusion is found in Justice
Stevens' concurrence, in which he stated that the "principal reason" for
rejecting the plaintiff's claim was the "overriding interest in keeping the
government.., out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of
differing religious claims."' 36 If the government grants religious exemp-
tions from its laws it inevitably will be forced to draw lines that require
judgments about religious beliefs. The long-term effect of repeated judg-
ments by government officials about the nature and weight of religious
beliefs might well be to interfere with the autonomy of religious life.
Similarly, in Goldman the Court rejected the claim of an Orthodox
Jewish Air Force officer that he be allowed to wear a skullcap while in
uniform. As in Lee, the majority relied on the government's interest in
enforcing rules without exceptions-here, the importance of standard-
ized uniforms to military morale and discipline. Also as in Lee, this gov-
ernmental interest is (as seven Justices concluded 37) significantly less
than compelling. The military already permits some deviations from the
standard uniform, and it is unlikely that unobtrusive accommodations to
religious practices would undermine military effectiveness in any way. 38
Justice Stevens again supplied a more plausible rationale for the
Court's result. Enforcement of a neutral rule, he said, serves the govern-
ment's "interest in uniform treatment for the members of all religious
faiths."' 39 Although accommodation might be made for skullcaps with-
out serious detriment to the appearance of uniformity, the demands of
other religions, such as turbans for Sikhs or dreadlocks for Rastafarians,
would not be so easily accommodated. It may be better, Justice Stevens
opined, to make no accommodation at all rather than to accommodate
the practices of some religions but not others.40
36 Id. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37 See Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1315 (Stevens, J., joined by White and Powell, JJ., concurring) ("a
modest departure from the uniform regulation creates almost no danger of impairment of the Air
Force's military mission"); id. at 1318 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The conten-
tion that the discipline of the armed forces will be subverted if Orthodox Jews are allowed to wear
yarmulkes with their uniforms surpasses belief."); id. at 1323 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Goldman's modest supplement to the Air Force uniform clearly poses by itself no threat to the
Nation's military readiness."); id. at 1326 (O'Connor, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
Government can present no sufficiently convincing proof in this case... that granting an exemption
... would do substantial harm to military discipline and esprit de corps.") (emphasis in original).
38 Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion makes this point persuasively. See Id. at 1318-21 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 1316 (Stevens, J., concurring).
40 Still another interpretation of Goldman is that it was a "military case," and that ordinary
constitutional principles do not apply, or apply with less force, in that context. See id. at 1313
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Even if Justice Stevens more plausibly explains the results in these
cases, his approach is more disturbing as a general principle for interpret-
ing the religion clauses. Justice Stevens acknowledges that his position
leaves "virtually no room for a 'constitutionally required exemption' on
religious grounds from a valid.., law that is entirely neutral in its gen-
eral application. ' 41 It also would invalidate legislation expressly accom-
modating religion except in those rare instances in which the free
exercise clause would require accommodation. 42 This is because legisla-
tive accommodations, no less than court-ordered accommodations, often
require religion-specific exemptions from facially neutral laws. If "strict
neutrality" is the dispositive principle, it should govern establishment
clause challenges to legislative accommodations as well as free exercise
cases. For reasons already discussed,43 this return to "strict neutrality"
would be inconsistent with the purposes of the free exercise clause.
This is not to say that Justice Stevens' arguments are without force.
I agree that special accommodation of religious needs can threaten reli-
gious autonomy. Requiring the government to interject religious consid-
erations into an otherwise objective decisionmaking process multiplies
the occasions for governmental (including judicial) inquiry into the
strength, sincerity, and importance of various religious claims. Although
these inquiries are not unconstitutional in themselves,44 they are better
kept to a minimum. There is but a fine line between government deter-
minations on religiously relevant legal issues and government pronounce-
ments on religious questions themselves. And I agree that
accommodating some religious practices but not others creates the poten-
tial for governmental (including judicial) favoritism.45 But I cannot
agree that these dangers, although serious, outweigh the arguments for
accommodation in every case.
Is there any way to identify the occasions when the dangers entailed
by explicit departures from religious neutrality are especially serious and
should outweigh claims for accommodation? I believe there is. In es-
sence, the problems just discussed are procedural. They have to do with
how the government goes about the task of accommodating religion and
when the accommodation itself infringes on religious liberty. The objec-
(majority opinion). Under this interpretation, Goldman means little to the development of free exer-
cise doctrine.
41 Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
42 This is one interpretation of a cryptic footnote in Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in
Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2491 n.45 (1985). I have criticized this view elsewhere. See
McConnell, supra note 30, at 29-34. It becomes even more objectionable if coupled with a hyper-
restrictive approach to the free exercise clause.
43 See supra text accompanying notes 26-3 1.
44 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-16 (1981); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 615
(1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45 For an elaboration of this point, see McConnell, supra note 30, at 39-41.
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tive is to ensure that decisions about religious accommodations be made
in such a forum, and under such procedures, as will make nonarbitrary,
evenhanded results most likely. An accommodation is suspect if it re-
quires officials who otherwise would exercise little discretion to make ad
hoc judgments. Such judgments would likely be the product of highly
subjective perceptions, and unlikely to be sufficiently sensitive to the
needs and practices of unfamiliar religious faiths. If, however, proce-
dures already exist for case-by-case determinations of a subjective nature
by responsible officials, or if the religious accommodation can be reduced
to a simple objective rule that can be administered at the operational
level, the dangers of arbitrariness are somewhat diminished.
Under this approach, the government's secular, programmatic inter-
est in enforcing neutral standards without religious exceptions should be
viewed in a new light. The court should consider not just the substantive
impact of the accommodation, but also its procedural impact. When de-
cisions must be made quickly, authoritatively, and evenhandedly by op-
erational personnel, the government may be entitled to resist interposing
requirements of religious accommodation. But when decisions already
involve case-by-case, subjective considerations, there should be little pro-
cedural objection to requiring the government to take religion into ac-
count as well.
This helps to explain why the free exercise claims in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner46 and Thomas v. Review Board47 prevailed over religiously neutral
unemployment compensation criteria. In these cases, the statutes in
question permitted compensation to persons who either left their work or
refused to accept certain types of work for "good cause" related to the
work; the issue was whether religious scruples constituted "good cause."
No additional procedural element was introduced into the unemploy-
ment compensation scheme as a result of the free exercise
accommodation.
The Court explicitly recognized these procedural considerations for
the first time in Bowen v. Roy.48 There, a three-Justice plurality stated:
Although in some situations a mechanism for individual consideration
will be created, a policy decision by a government that it wishes to treat all
applicants alike and that it does not wish to become involved in case-by-
case inquiries into the genuineness of each religious objection to such condi-
tion or restrictions is entitled to substantial deference. 49
The Court did not state, but I think it should be inferred, that when the
46 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
47 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
48 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
49 Id. at 2156 (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun made a similar point in Goldman, with the
useful caveat that the procedural problems invoked by the government must be substantiated and
not merely assumed. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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government already is involved in case-by-case determinations, this argu-
ment provides no basis for refusing to accommodate legitimate religious
needs. And the Court did state, but I think it should be emphasized, that
in some instances the religious claim for exemption will be so strong that
the government may be required to establish procedures for its protec-
tion.50 The procedural argument, while meriting "substantial defer-
ence,"' 51 must not be treated as an excuse for denying all free exercise
claims.
How should this approach be applied in practice? In Lee, the proce-
dural mechanism already existed for administering religious objections to
Social Security taxation: Congress had adopted such procedures for self-
employed persons.5 2 That strongly suggests that the accommodation
could be extended without seriously threatening religious autonomy. In
Lee, then, the procedural objections to accommodation were minimal,
and in light of the exiguous substantive impact on the government's
programmatic interests, the free exercise claim should have been granted.
By contrast, in Goldman, procedural considerations may reinforce
the government's position. Upon initial study, Captain Goldman's claim
seems to be as strong as any free exercise claim ever to reach the Supreme
Court. His religious interest is obvious and important. The govern-
ment's countervailing interest in uniformity of dress seems less weighty;
indeed, Captain Goldman had been permitted to wear his yarmulke for
three years, without incident, prior to the lawsuit. 53 Nonetheless, the
procedural aspects of the Goldman claim are somewhat troubling. Pre-
sumably, uniform regulations are enforced on a decentralized basis, on
the spot, largely by noncommissioned officers. It is not implausible to
argue that asking noncommissioned officers to weigh the need for reli-
gious accommodations would result in arbitrary decisions. Moreover, to
establish a board of review for objections to uniform requirements might
well create the disciplinary problems and confusion the military has
stated that it fears. These concerns may be sufficiently serious to make
Goldman a close case-and plaintiffs lose in close cases in the military.
On the other hand, it is possible to imagine ways in which military dress
regulations could be modified to permit certain easily identifiable and un-
derstood deviations. This has, indeed, already been done to a certain
extent.54
As an institutional matter, the courts are not well equipped to devise
50 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2156.
51 Id.
52 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1982). Thus, "[a]s a matter of administration, it would be a relatively
simple matter to extend the exemption to the taxes involved in this case." Lee, 455 U.S. at 262
(Stevens, J., concurring).
53 Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312.
54 Air Force uniform regulations permit the wearing of up to three rings and one identification
bracelet of "neat and conservative design"; of headgear during indoor religious ceremonies; of
nonvisible religious garb, in the discretion of the base commander; and of visible religious garb in
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or require changes of a systemic nature. It may well be, therefore, that
accommodations to military uniform requirements are better fashioned
by Congress and the military authorities rather than in lawsuits under
the free exercise clause. This is not merely a forlorn hope; Congress al-
ready has passed legislation to prod the military in the direction of ac-
commodating minority religious practices. 55  But such an
accommodation, to be valid under the establishment clause, must pass
judicial scrutiny. It cannot do so unless departures from neutrality, for
the purpose of fostering religious liberty, are permitted. A doctrine of
strict neutrality would be no less fatal to a legislative accommodation
than it proved to be to Captain Goldman's constitutional claim.
In summary, the most common reason for departing from relig-
iously neutral governmental standards is that an incidental consequence
of the standards is to prevent (or impose substantial costs on) religiously
motivated practices. In such instances, the appropriate course is to cre-
ate a religious exception, unless the government's secular, programmatic
interest would be thwarted by the exception, or unless the procedures for
administering the exception would introduce serious dangers of arbitrary
determinations of relevant religious questions.
IV. INTERFERENCE WITH A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION'S INTERNAL
STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE
A second reason for departing from neutrality is that regulation of
religious institutions on the same basis as secular institutions would in-
terfere with the right of the church 56 to organize its internal affairs in
accord with its own doctrine.57 Examples are the church property
cases, 58 the application of labor laws to church organizations, 59 and (in
inverted fashion) the "entanglement" analysis of Lemon v. Kurtzman.60
This potential for interference presents the strongest possible case for de-
parture from religious neutrality, for three reasons.
designated living quarters, in the discretion of the base commander. See id. at 1314; id. at 1319
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
55 Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 554, 98 Stat. 2492,
2532 (1984).
56 Here, as elsewhere, I use the term "church" to denote any religious organization.
57 See generally Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Reli-
gious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984).
58 E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
59 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
60 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The "entanglement" notion is inverted because the interest pro-
tected-the right of the church to be free of excessive governmental interference with its religious
mission-is in this context asserted by the church's opponents in the litigation. There may be stand-
ing problems here, as Professor Laycock has pointed out. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 27; see also
Gaffney, The Religion Clauses: Disentangling Entanglement and Relieving the Tension, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. - (1987) (forthcoming).
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First, the importance to free exercise of the church's right to organ-
ize its internal affairs is exceptionally high. Religious experience typi-
cally is communal and institutional, not individualistic. Freedom of
religion demands that believers be able to organize themselves and that
religious organizations be autonomous. For religious institutions to ful-
fill their role, they must be permitted to control their own organization;
to formulate and enforce their own doctrine; to choose their own struc-
ture; to select their own officials; to recognize their own criteria for mem-
bership; and to adopt their own set of relationships between believer and
institution and between hierarchy (if any) and subordinate. If the gov-
ernment assumes control over these matters, then the church loses its
independent existence. Free exercise cannot survive if the internal affairs
of religious institutions are subject to governmental control.
Second, the government's programmatic interest is exceptionally
weak. The doctrine and internal organization of a religious institution
should be of no concern to the government unless it somehow affects
outsiders. Governmental regulation that is either paternalistic (assuming
that the individual is not capable of judging his own interests) or protec-
tive (assuming that the individual will be exploited by powerful institu-
tions) has little place in the religion context. The premise of the religion
clauses is that individuals are capable of choice in the religious realm and
the government is not.6' And if believers choose to subordinate their
material interests to the religious body, the government is not free-ab-
sent extraordinary circumstances-to label the relation "exploitation" or
to protect the individual from the consequences of his religious convic-
tions. To be sure, this may mean that the church will adopt policies that
seem to the outsider unjust, unwise, or exploitative. For better or worse,
the church may not always conform to the outside world. But it is of no
concern of the government to reform the church. The government's le-
gitimate interest extends no further than the material sphere. 62
Third, in contrast to religious exceptions for individual believers, de-
partures from neutrality in order to preserve the internal autonomy of
religious organizations reduce the need for procedural or administrative
involvement by the government in matters of religious belief.63 That is
why separationists often join with those principally concerned with reli-
gious liberty in support of religious exemptions in this area. Just as ex-
clusion from government aid programs can reduce "entanglement"
61 The concept of "choice" in this context is merely a secular interpretation of the religious
experience. In some traditions, the believer is understood to have been chosen, rather than as having
done the choosing. For elaboration of this point, see Garvey, supra note 30, at 791-92.
62 This is not the occasion for an extended treatment of the exceptions to this principle. I would
not go much further than immediate threats to health. See, eg., State ex reL Swann v. Pack, 527
S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975) (snake handling as part of worship service prohibited by law).
63 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 496 (1979); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
669-70 (1970).
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between religious institutions and the state, so also can exemption from
governmental regulation. Indeed, the central insight of the Court's "en-
tanglement" notion under the establishment clause is that churches
should be free from the control that comes along with the aid. When
regulation is imposed in the absence of aid, there is no less need to avoid
"entanglement." The establishment clause contemplates a mutual inde-
pendence of the institutional structures of religion and government.
Neither is permitted to control the other. Separation of church and state
therefore cannot be understood as a requirement that churches be denied
"aid" or "benefits"; it means that they should be independent of the
state. Religious organizations must be exempt from the heavy hand of
governmental regulation when that regulation impinges upon their inter-
nal organization.
The Dayton Christian Schools case 4 is an excellent example. In that
case, a pervasively religious private school (that is, a school that inte-
grates religious teaching into the entire curriculum) challenged the au-
thority of a state civil rights commission to investigate its decision to
discharge one of its teachers on religious grounds when she became preg-
nant. The teacher complained to the commission that her discharge vio-
lated two state laws, one requiring employers to treat men and women
equally, the other prohibiting employers from retaliating against employ-
ees who allege violations before the commission. The school contended
that enforcement of these laws would interfere with matters of internal
organization governed by religious doctrine. According to the school's
sincerely held religious belief, scripture demands that women with young
children stay at home to rear them; moreover, disputes within the reli-
gious community must be resolved internally rather than by resort to
secular authorities. 65 For the teacher to continue to teach at the school
would thus be in violation of two of the school's religious tenets. At
stake in the case, therefore, was whether a religious institution can main-
tain its identity by confining its teaching to those who adhere to its doc-
trines. If the state can compel a religious institution to rehire a person to
a teaching position despite that person's departure from religious doc-
trine, then the church loses the ability to control its voice.
Although the Court held that the school's federal court challenge to
the state law was barred by either the abstention doctrine or the ripeness
doctrine, it seems evident that the school's claims should ultimately be
vindicated on the merits. There is little substance to the constitutional
right to operate or attend a religious private school66 if the school cannot
64 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986).
65 Cf Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872):
All who unite themselves to [a voluntary religious organization] do so with the implied consent
to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would
lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their deci-
sions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.
66 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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insist that its teachers conform to church doctrine. 67
A second major justification for departing from religious neutrality,
then, is to preserve the autonomy of religious organizations. The govern-
ment has broad powers to regulate the internal governance of many
forms of association, from business corporations to social clubs. But the
internal organization and doctrine of religious organizations are beyond
the government's authority. To treat religious organizations "neutrally"
would be to neglect this important difference.
V. THE EFFECT OF A PERVASIVE GOVERNMENTAL PRESENCE
The third circumstance in which departure from religious neutrality
is justified is the most relevant to this Symposium, and it is where I most
differ from the common contemporary understanding of neutrality under
the religion clauses. I believe that when the government so dominates
and controls a particular area that private activity and initiative are
crowded out, a course of true neutrality is not available. If there are to
be religious elements, they must deliberately be introduced by the gov-
ernment; if the government does not take affirmative steps to make room
for religious elements, the environment will be wholly secular. Secular-
ism is not neutrality.
The classic example of this is the prison. If an inmate is locked up,
away from his books and his minister, a government practice of "strict
neutrality"-meaning refusal to purchase Bibles for the prison library or
to provide prison chaplains-is not truly neutral.68 To refuse special
treatment for religion in this context is to stifle religious expression and
practice. Neutrality, properly understood, requires an examination of
the totality of governmental action rather than a focus on the particular
religious element in controversy. 69 It would be mistaken to ask whether
the government's appointment of a prison chaplain "advances" religion
in the abstract, without recognizing first that the government has taken
away the inmate's right to worship with the minister of his own choos-
ing. I do not contend that hiring a prison chaplain is "neutral"; I merely
note that failing to hire a chaplain is not neutral either.
The public schools are a less extreme example of this point. The
compulsory education laws, combined with the government's refusal (or
67 Cf Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary and Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877
(Ky. 1979) (control over curriculum; interpreting Kentucky Constitution).
68 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972); see also Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50
(1908) (when Secretary of Interior controls financial resources of Indian tribe, it does not violate
establishment clause for him to enter into contracts with religious organization for parochial educa-
tion); Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (upholding government placement
and support of children in foster homes run by their parents' religious denomination).
69 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 21 (footnote omitted) ("State efforts to alleviate discriminatory
or state-imposed burdens on religious exercise are consistent with neutrality, even though any such
effort, considered in isolation, will appear as an aid to religion.").
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supposed constitutional incapacity) to fund private alternatives to public
education, have the effect of removing children from their homes for six
to eight hours a day and channeling them into the public schools. The
public school dominates the education of the children who attend it; it
provides, or at least purports to provide, a comprehensive education.
Whatever one's religious beliefs may be, it is impossible to deny that reli-
gion plays and has played a major role in shaping the realities of life,
culture, and politics, or that religious thought is an important strand in
philosophy and the history of ideas generally. Yet the public schools in
recent years have chosen to pretend that religion does not exist, at least
in any serious or relevant way. Even the separationist, antifundamental-
ist organization People for the American Way recently has announced
the results of a study showing that references to religion have been re-
moved from public school history textbooks:
While history textbooks talk about the existence of religious diversity in
America, they do not show it: Jews exist only as objects of discrimination;
Catholics exist to be discriminated against and to ask for government
money for their own schools; there is no reflection of the diversity within
American Protestantism-it is difficult to find Evangelicals, Fundamental-
ists, Episcopalians, Lutherans, or Methodists; the Quakers are shown giving
us religious freedom and abolition, and then apparently disappear off the
face of the earth.70
The secularization of public education-the systematic avoidance of
reference to religious matters--ought therefore to be troubling not just to
those whose beliefs are thereby denigrated, but also to those who wish
history, social studies, humanities, and like subjects to be taught straight.
But the impact of this artificial secularization on the children in the class-
room-especially the religious children-is even more serious. If the
public school day and all its teaching is strictly secular, the child is likely
to learn the lesson that religion is irrelevant to the significant things of
this world, or at least that the spiritual realm is radically separate and
distinct from the temporal. However unintended, these are lessons about
religion. They are not "neutral." Studious silence on a subject that par-
ents may say touches all of life is an eloquent refutation.
A proper recognition of the place of religion within such subjects as
history, social studies, and humanities would be a major step toward rec-
tifying the public school's implicit denigration of religion. Students of a
religious persuasion would learn that their way of thinking, no less than
that of others, is relevant and even important to the world. Moreover, so
long as the teaching is substantively valid and handled in a professional
70 Quoted in 3 RELIGION & Soc'Y REPORT, No. 11, at 8 (Nov. 1986). Two other recent studies,
one by Professor Paul Vitz under the auspices of the Department of Education, the other by Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State, corroborate the conclusion that references to reli-
gion have been removed systematically from public school education. See C. HAYNES, TEACHING
ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1985); P. Vrrz, RELIGION AND TRADITIONAL VALUES IN PUBLIC
SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (1985).
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way, the rights of other students will not be infringed. But it should not
be thought that objective teaching about religion can entirely satisfy the
religious element in education. An objective teaching is quite different
from the understanding of religion as truth, and can even appear to be
hostile to religious faith. It is easy to imagine how teaching about a stu-
dent's religion from the perspective of sociology or anthropology, for ex-
ample, might import a subjectivism and skepticism that would be
profoundly disquieting.
On the other hand, including explicit religious teaching or religious
exercises in public school is not "neutral" either, for students of other
faiths or no faith at all will be captive to the religious teaching. Teaching
religion is far more problematic that teaching about religion. The public
schools unavoidably must choose between maintaining a secular posture,
which in most contexts is artificial and nonneutral, and subjecting nonbe-
lievers and other believers to the possibility of governmental coercion or
indoctrination.
While I do not think the problem should be oversimplified by acting
as if secularism were the same thing as neutrality, I nonetheless believe,
for two reasons, that there should be no government-sponsored religious
exercises (vocal prayers, Bible study as scripture) in the public schools.
First, as a practical matter, it is probably easier for parents to supplement
the public school curriculum with a religious element than for parents
who oppose such an element to eradicate its effects. More important, a
government-prescribed religious element in the schools must inevitably
favor not just religion over nonreligion, but one religion or group of reli-
gions-probably the majority's-over the others. This is true even of
"lowest common denominator" religion such as that reflected in the Re-
gent's Prayer in Engel v. Vitale.71 In short, overt religious exercises in
the public schools create more serious constitutional problems than they
solve.
I do conclude, however, that the public schools should seek out
ways to accommodate religious practice. If the students are able to bring
their religion with them into the schools, the schools' pervasive secular-
ism can be tempered without government initiative or involvement. Such
accommodations are acceptable only if they involve no pressure upon
unwilling students to participate, and if they are genuinely neutral among
the beliefs present in the school population, including atheism and agnos-
ticism. 72 For this reason, I would uphold released-time programs,73 mo-
71 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962) ("Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and
we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.").
72 I have explained the reasons for these limitations in McConnell, supra note 30, at 34-41.
73 I agree with Professor Laycock that the distinction between on-premises and off-premises
released time should not be decisive, see Laycock, supra note 3, at 33, but I disagree with him that
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), which upheld off-premises released time, is "utterly indefen-
sible." Laycock, supra note 3, at 33. The dispositive factor is whether alternative uses of the time
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ment-of-silence laws, and open forums for extracurricular activities,
including religious group meetings-not because they are neutral
(though they can be neutral), but because they create an opportunity for
religious exercise in what otherwise would be a wholly secular
environment.
Even among supporters of these policies, it is common to disagree
with this approach. It is assumed that the public school can be entirely
neutral, throwing its weight neither for nor against religion. Professor
Laycock, for example, states that the "religious right" and "secular left"
share the common "fallacy" that neutrality in the public schools is im-
possible.74 The "religious right" argues that an entirely secular public
school will be perceived by students as hostile toward religion, while the
''secular left" argues that tolerating religion in the public schools will be
perceived as support for religion. He goes on to say that these groups
"can both be wrong, but they cannot both be correct."' 75 I am not so
sure. I think that both may be correct. I would agree with the "secular
left" that any deliberate introduction of religious elements into public
education, such as released-time programs or moments of silence, is in a
sense nonneutral. And I would agree with the "religious right" that a
systematic exclusion of all religious elements from public education is
likewise nonneutral. In an environment pervasively controlled by the
government, it is pointless to seek a strictly neutral position. It does not
exist.
76
The advocates of neutrality treat the public school as if it were iden-
tical to society at large, in which governmental intervention is the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Freedom in society at large is mostly
negative-the freedom to be left alone.77 But in a school there is little
room for autonomous conduct, and the autonomy that exists is generally
created deliberately by school officials. Freedom in school generally re-
quires the administration to create an opportunity for free conduct-to
start a school newspaper, to set up an extracurricular activities period, to
are sufficiently attractive that there is no coercion to attend the religious classes. Whether study hall
suffices is an empirical question. I could imagine that the opportunity to get one's homework done
at school would be highly regarded. The opposite might also be true. The reason that religion may
be "single[d] out" in this context, see Laycock, supra note 3, at 33, is that it is the only important
area of learning that may not be taught by the public school teachers themselves.
74 Laycock, supra note 3, at 19-20. Professor Laycock has labelled this observation his "most
important new argument" in defense of equal access policies. Id. at 4 n.12.
75 Id. at 19.
76 Professor Laycock briefly addresses the argument that "the refusal to teach religion in the
public schools is also nonneutral." Id. at 30. His "answer" is that "that is the cost of committing
religion to private choice and avoiding the dangers associated with governments that take positions
on religion." Id. This answer is revealing because it is not an argument that failing to teach religion
is neutral, but that there are good reasons, grounded in religious autonomy, for treating religion in
this nonneutral way. That is precisely my point.
77 See Currie, Positive and Negative Rights, 53 U. CH. L. REv. 864 (1986).
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permit student government. 78 The school is likely only to create the free-
dom to engage in activities that are, generally speaking, wholesome or
worthwhile. In Williamsport High School, for example, only groups that
will contribute to the "intellectual, physical or social development of the
students" 79 can meet during the activities period. Toleration of religion
in the public school, since it generally requires affirmative accommoda-
tion, is thus difficult (if not theoretically impossible) to distinguish from
endorsement, just as exclusion of religion is indistinguishable from hostil-
ity to religion.
Public schools thus present vexing constitutional problems. How
can the government offer a comprehensive education without crossing
the fine line into indoctrination? How can it teach one proposition with-
out disparaging propositions inconsistent with it? How can it choose not
to teach a doctrine without creating an impression of disapproval? When
a controversial volume is added to the library, does that constitute ap-
proval? When it is removed, does that constitute censorship?80 When
the school declines to teach evolution, does it favor religion? When it
teaches evolution without creationism, does it favor nonreligion?81
Should religious themes, persons, or motivations be included in class
readings? Should there be moral education? Should there be sex educa-
tion? How can all this be accomplished "neutrally"?
I do not believe that answers to these questions can be based on a
dogma of neutrality. If perfect neutrality is what we want, we must elim-
inate public schools. 82 The best we can do, in my view, is to foster plu-
ralism and diversity-to encourage as wide a range of views to be
presented and expounded as is practical, and to avoid when possible an
authoritative position on issues known to be controversial. That is not
the same thing as secularism. But neither is it necessarily the same thing
as neutrality. It requires the public schools to seek out ways to make
room for religious elements by means that do not compel religious ob-
servances by students who are unwilling or indifferent.
The equal access policy in Bender raises no conflict between liberty
and neutrality because the decision to allow students to meet on school
property for extracurricular activities of their choice enhanced religious
78 There is a sense in which all liberty depends upon governmental action for its protection. This
has caused some to argue that there is no genuine governmental neutrality in any sphere. See, eg.,
Frug, Why Neutrality?, 92 YALE L.J. 1591, 1592-96 (1983). It suffices for present purposes to note
that the differences in degree of governmental pervasiveness between, say, a prison or a public school
and the marketplace or a voluntary association are large and justify differences in treatment.
79 Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 548 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting state-
ment by school official), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986).
80 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
81 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); see also Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251
(5th Cir. 1985), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1946 (1986).
82 See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 104-05 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978) (expounding version of what is
now called "voucher" plan).
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liberty (once religion was given equal access) and at the same time was
essentially neutral both in purpose and effect.
Critics sometimes suggest that equal access imposes religion on
other students because it enables students to "proselytize. ' 83 But the
right to proselytize, a.k.a. freedom of speech, is constitutionally pro-
tected, whether or not religious groups have the right to meet on school
premises. It is evident, therefore, that these critics' complaint goes far
beyond equal access: they must equally object to uncensored conversa-
tion in the halls, cafeteria, and anywhere students might discuss their
ideas and concerns. It would take full-time thought police to ensure that
students are protected from the opinions of their peers. Ironically, these
critics should welcome equal access, since during the time religious be-
lievers are gathered together they will not be engaged in spreading the
faith to others. Equal access itself has nothing to do with the right to
proselytize; equal access merely ensures the right of willing students to
gather together to talk about matters of common concern.
The moment-of-silence policy of Wallace v. Jaffree84 is somewhat
more problematic. Although the effect of the policy, properly adminis-
tered, is neutral (students being free to use the time for whatever silent
purposes they may choose), the purpose of providing the opportunity
was to facilitate private prayer. It was as if, in Bender, the school had set
up the extracurricular activities period in the hope that religious student
groups would be formed.
I do not believe that this departure from neutrality (of purpose) is
troublesome. On the contrary, I believe that in the context of the public
school the government should seek out ways to allow students who wish
to recognize a religious element in their education to do so. I take some
comfort from the fact that no less a separationist than Thomas Jefferson
thought so too.8 5 While deliberate government introduction of religious
elements into most situations would be inappropriate, doing so when
government control is so pervasive that there can be no religious element
in the absence of government accommodation is a different matter.86
83 See generally Teitel, supra note 4.
84 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
85 See 19 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 413-16 (1905) (Report of the Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia, Oct. 7, 1822); 7 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 266-67 (1861) (Letter to
Dr. Cooper, Nov. 2, 1822).
86 I do not believe that the constitutionality of moment-of-silence laws should turn on their
particular phrasing, so long as they do not purport to require students to pray. Professor Laycock's
contrary argument is based on the proposition that the term "contemplation" in the statutes "takes
on religious coloration" because it is used in conjunction (more precisely, disjunction) with the terms
"meditation" and "prayer." Laycock, supra note 3, at 60. The opposite conclusion is linguistically
more plausible: when the legislature uses the phrase "meditation or prayer" it suggests that there is
a difference between the two. But in any event, the statute presumably is not read to the students.
The constitutionality of moment-of-silence laws should turn on whether, in fact, the statute is prop-
erly administered.
81:146 (1986) Freedom or Neutrality?
Equal access policies and moments of silence present the easy case.
They enable the government to accommodate serious and substantial
religious needs without departing significantly from the ideal of neutral-
ity and without invading the religious liberty of nonbelievers and other
believers. I do not quarrel, therefore, with defending these policies on
the ground that they are neutral. But if this argument implies that neu-
trality alone suffices as a full embodiment of the principles of religious
freedom in the first amendment, I think it is mistaken. Neutrality often,
indeed usually, serves the cause of religious liberty; but when it does not,
a proper appreciation for the needs of religious practitioners requires
something more.
